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A model balancing cooperation and competition explains our right-handed world and
the dominance of left-handed athletes
Daniel M. Abrams1, ∗ and Mark J. Panaggio1, †
1Department of Engineering Sciences and Applied Mathematics,
Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA
An overwhelming majority of humans are right-handed. Numerous explanations for individual
handedness have been proposed, but this population-level handedness remains puzzling. Here we
use a minimal mathematical model to explain this population-level hand preference as an evolved
balance between cooperative and competitive pressures in human evolutionary history. We use
selection of elite athletes as a test-bed for our evolutionary model and account for the surprising
distribution of handedness in many professional sports. Our model predicts strong lateralization in
social species with limited combative interaction, and elucidates the rarity of compelling evidence
for “pawedness” in the animal world.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the precise definition of handedness is often
debated, it is widely accepted that roughly one in ten hu-
mans are left-handed [1, 2]. Since prehistoric times, mi-
nor cultural and geographical variations in this percent-
age have been observed, but every historical population
has shown the same strong bias toward right-handedness
[1–5]. Both genetic and environmental factors seem to
contribute to handedness for individuals [5–9]; nonethe-
less, individual handedness does not necessarily lead to
species-level handedness. It is well-established that for
an individual, lateralization can be advantageous [10, 11]:
for example, it allows for specialization of brain function
[7, 12] which may lead to enhanced cognition through
parallel information processing [13, 14]. At the species
level, however, the advantage of lateralization is not well
understood [14]. Negative frequency-dependent selection
alone, a primary mechanism by which polymorphisms are
maintained [15, 16], can only produce a balanced distri-
bution of left- and right-handers due to the symmetry
inherent in handedness.
2. OUR MODEL
There have been various attempts to account for
species-level asymmetry with the use of “fitness func-
tions” [10, 16]. We propose a different approach to the
problem. We define a function PRL(l) representing the
mean probability that a right-handed individual (male
or female) bears left-handed offspring in a given time pe-
riod. A minimal model for the evolution of the societal
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fraction left-handed l in terms of this arbitrary frequency-
dependent transition rate PRL(l) is given by
dl
dt
= (1 − l)PRL(l) − lPLR(l). (2.1)
We assume symmetry between right- and left-handers
(supplementary material section S1), so that we may
write PLR(l) = PRL(1 − l) to obtain
dl
dt
= (1 − l)PRL(l) − lPRL(1 − l). (2.2)
This function incorporates frequency-dependent selection
effects, and can be approximated given a biological model
for inheritance (supplementary material section S2, figure
S1).
In a purely competitive society, it would be natural
to assume P comp
RL
to be a monotonically decreasing func-
tion of l. When left-handers are scarce, they have an
advantage in physical confrontations due to their greater
experience against right-handers and the right-handers’
lack of experience against them. As their numbers grow,
that advantage weakens [4, 16].
However, in a purely cooperative society, physical con-
frontations would not exist, and all individuals would
tend to the same handedness to increase cooperative ef-
ficiency and eliminate the fitness disadvantage of the mi-
nority handedness [4, 10, 14]. (The modern presence of
a higher accidental death rate for left-handers [17–19]
demonstrates that a fitness differential persists today.)
Thus P coop
RL
would increase monotonically with l.
For a system involving both cooperative and competi-
tive interactions, we therefore write
PRL(l) = cP
coop
RL
(l) + (1 − c)P comp
RL
(l),
where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 represents the degree of cooperation in
interactions and the monotonicity properties of each com-
ponent function are as given above. For physically rea-
sonable choices of these functions, there may exist one,
three, or five fixed points l∗ in this system, depending on
the value of c.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium percentages left-handed as a function
of societal cooperativity. Solid lines indicate stable equilib-
ria, dashed unstable. (a) Monotonic dPRL/dt on (0,1/2). (b)
Nonmonotonic dPRL/dt on (0,1/2). Insets: PRL and its com-
ponent functions P coop
RL
, P comp
RL
.
Figure 1 shows the typical positions of stable and
unstable equilibria for equation (2.1), where P coop
RL
and
P
comp
RL
have been chosen to be generic sigmoid functions
(sigmoid functions arise naturally in models where sepa-
rate fitness functions exist for left- and right-handers —
see supplementary material section S3). When the de-
gree of cooperation c is less than a critical threshold,
the only stable equilibrium is l∗ = 0.5: a 50/50 split
between left-hand and right-hand dominant individuals.
This is consistent with studies showing individual but not
population-level bias in various species [9, 20].
When the degree of cooperation exceeds a critical
threshold, two new stable equilibria appear as a result
of either a subcritical or supercritical pitchfork bifurca-
tion (depending on the exact form of the function PRL).
These equilibria indicate population-level lateralization
as seen in human society. The fraction right- or left-
handed will depend on the exact value of the cooperation
parameter c.
There is a qualitative difference between the two situ-
ations depicted in figure 1, a difference which holds for a
broad class of sigmoid functions PRL. In the case of the
subcritical pitchfork (figure 1a), no weak population lat-
eralization should ever be observed since equilibria near
50% are unstable; however, in the case of the supercrit-
ical pitchfork (figure 1b), population lateralization near
50% will be possible, though only stable for a small range
of values of c. Both suggest that weak population later-
alization (fractions ∼50% − 70%) should be rare in the
natural world, while indicating that a high degree of co-
operation may be responsible for the strong lateralization
(fractions ∼70%− 100%) observed in some social animals
(e.g., humans, parrots [21]).
4. COMPARISON OF MODEL PREDICTIONS
WITH DATA
Thus far we have attempted to describe the evolution
of the fraction left-handed in populations of lateralized
individuals. Ideally, we would compare predicted equilib-
ria of equation (2.2) to data from animal populations ex-
hibiting varying degrees of cooperation. For most species,
however, quantifying the degree of cooperation is diffi-
cult, and data on population-level lateralization is scarce
and sometimes contradictory. This lack of information
about the natural world leads us to examine the proxy
situation of athletics, where data on handedness and co-
operation is more easily accessible.
To explain the observed fraction of athletes left-
handed, it is important to model the selection process
because athletics, unlike evolution, should not cause
changes in the population’s background rate of lateral-
ity. We treat athletic skill s as a normally distributed
random variable, and assume that minority handedness
creates a frequency-dependent shift ∆s that modifies the
randomly distributed skill. We then model an ideal selec-
tion process as choosing the n most skilled players from
a population of N interested individuals. Such a model
(derived in detail in supplementary material section S4)
predicts that the professional fraction left-handed lpro
will depend on the fraction selected ψ = n/N , and is
determined implicitly by the equation
lpro =
lbg
2
erfc(sˆc −∆sˆ)/ψ, (4.1)
where lbg ≈ 10% is the background rate of left-
handedness, erfc is the complementary error function, sˆc
is the normalized cut-off in skill level for selection, and
∆sˆ ∝ l∗ − lpro is the normalized skill advantage for left-
handers. Here l∗ represents the fraction of the population
that would be left-handed in a world consisting only of
interactions through the sport under consideration. Its
value is determined from equation (2.2), with a choice of
3parameter c appropriate for the sport under considera-
tion (PRL is reinterpreted as the mean probability that a
right-handed player is replaced by a left-hander in a given
time period). Note that lpro must lie between lbg and l
∗:
with very high selectivity (ψ → 0) equation (4.1) implies
that lpro → l∗ , and with very low selectivity (ψ → 1)
lpro → lbg.
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Figure 2. Observed percentage left-handed versus predicted
for professional athletes of various sports. ▲ =Baseball
(MLB), ▼ =Boxing (Men’s), ◀ =Fencing (Men’s), ▶ =Fencing
(Women’s), ● =Football (Quarterbacks, NFL), ∎ =Golf
(PGA), △ =Golf (LPGA), ▽ =Hockey (Right Wings, NHL),
◁ =Hockey (Left Wings, NHL) , ▷ =Hockey (Other, NHL),
○ =Table Tennis (Men’s), ◻ =Table Tennis (Women’s).
Dashed line represents perfect agreement between predicted
and observed values. Vertical error bars correspond to 95%
confidence intervals (p = 0.05); horizontal error bars corre-
spond to predictions using plus or minus one order of mag-
nitude in N , the primary source of uncertainty. Left-handed
advantage ∆sˆ = kˆ(l∗ − lpro) where kˆ = 1.6108 and both l
∗ and
lpro vary from sport to sport (see table S1 and supplementary
material section S5)
Figure 2 shows our application of equation (4.1) to
various professional sports. To reduce arbitrary free pa-
rameters, we assume that the cooperativity c is close to
zero for physically competitive sports and one for sports
(e.g., golf) that require lateralized equipment or strategy.
Figure 1 then implies that the ideal equilibrium fraction
left-handed l∗ will be 50% when c is close to zero, and
will be either 0% or 100% when c = 1.
The predictions for figure 2 were made by varying a sin-
gle free parameter k, the constant of proportionality for
the frequency-dependent skill advantage ∆sˆ = k(l∗−lpro).
To avoid over-fitting, we took this to be a constant across
all sports; given sufficient data, different values of k could
be estimated independently for each sport. The fraction
selected ψ was estimated from the ratio of professional
athletes to the number of frequent participants for each
sport (see supplementary material section S5 for details).
For the sport of baseball, the great abundance of his-
torical statistical information allows us to validate our
proposed selection mechanism. To do so, we use our
model to predict the cumulative fraction left-handed lr
as a function of rank r, then compare to data.
In sports where highly-rated players interact with
other highly-rated players preferentially (e.g., boxing),
we expect the left-handed advantage ∆sˆr ∝ l
∗ − lr to
be rank-dependent (i.e., depending on the fraction left-
handed at rank r). However, within professional base-
ball leagues, all players interact with all other players
at nearly the same rate, so the left-handed advantage
∆sˆr = ∆sˆ should be independent of rank, i.e., a con-
stant. This leads us (see supplementary material section
S4 for derivation) to the equation
lr =
lbg
2
erfc(sˆr −∆sˆ)/(r/N). (4.2)
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Figure 3. Cumulative fraction left-handed versus rank for
seasonal top hitters in baseball, 1871-2009. Thin red line
represents theoretical prediction from equation (4.2). Each
black data point at rank r represents the left-handed fraction
of all U.S. born players that finished a season ranked in the
top r by total hits. The left-handed advantage ∆sˆ = 0.3003
was computed by finding the least-squares best fit. This value
differs slightly from the value used for baseball in figure 2
(∆sˆ = 0.2755) suggesting that, in practice, the proportionality
constant k may vary from sport to sport.
Figure 3 shows the predictions of equation (4.2) as ap-
plied to the top-ranked baseball players from 1871 to
2009. Only one free parameter was varied: the left-
handed advantage ∆sˆ. All other parameters were con-
strained by known data [22]. The surprisingly good fit to
this nontrivial curve can be seen as supporting evidence
for the selection model. Together with the accuracy of
predictions in figure 2, this supports the conclusion that
the equilibria of equation (2.2) are indeed relevant to real-
world lateralized systems.
45. DISCUSSION
Despite the good agreement of our predictions with
real-world data, we acknowledge that there are limita-
tions in reducing a complex adaptive system to a sim-
ple mathematical model. Our model includes undeter-
mined functions that would be difficult to measure pre-
cisely (although we found that qualitative predictions are
robust — see supplementary material section S6). How-
ever, they can be roughly approximated from available
data and may be easier to estimate than fitness func-
tions proposed in other models. Sports data may not
be completely analogous to data from the natural world;
hence, quantitative analysis of lateralization in social an-
imal groups may be a fruitful line of future research.
Given the limited data on population-level lateral bias
in the natural world, we feel that analysis of athlet-
ics provides new insight into the evolutionary origins of
handedness. Our model predictions match the observed
distribution of handedness in baseball with just a sin-
gle free parameter. When applied to 12 groups of elite
athletes, the same model does a good job of estimat-
ing the fraction left-handed in each, suggesting that the
proposed balance between cooperation and competition
accurately predicts the ideal equilibrium distribution of
handedness. Our model is general enough to be applied
to any species of animal, and may also have use in under-
standing population-level lateralized adaptations other
than handedness, both physical and behavioural.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The model we have presented is the first to take a dy-
namical systems approach to the problem of laterality.
It allows for the prediction of conditions under which
population-level lateral bias can be expected to emerge
in the animal world and its evolution over time. We
exploit the connection between natural selection and se-
lection in professional sports by introducing a novel data
set on handedness among athletes, demonstrating a clear
relationship between cooperative social behaviour and
population-level lateral bias.
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6SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
S1: The symmetry of handedness
There have been various attempts to account for species-level laterality. Billiard et al. [16] point out that left-
handedness is “associated with several fitness costs.” Thus the population-level bias can be maintained through a
balance between a frequency-dependent fitness function and a constant fitness cost. An alternate model by Ghirlanda
et al. [10] suggests that the combination of “antagonistic” and “synergistic” interactions and their associated frequency-
dependent fitness functions can create an evolutionarily stable equilibrium with an asymmetric (and non-trivial)
distribution of lateralization.
While both models have merit, they disagree on a fundamental question: Are left- and right-handedness interchange-
able? In other words, is a mirror image world of 90% left-handers and 10% right-handers equally plausible? Billiard et
al. suggest that the fitness costs “such as lower height and reduced longevity...are not likely to be frequency-dependent.”
Thus these fitness costs break the symmetry and guarantee that only the observed handedness distribution is possible.
However, the aforementioned fitness costs have only been observed in a biased population consisting of lateralized
individuals. For example, Aggleton et al. [19] show that left-handers are more likely to die prematurely, and that
this effect is at least partially due to “increased vulnerability to both accidental death and death during warfare.”
They go on to argue that “the most likely explanation for the increase in accidental death among the left-handed
men concerns their need to cope in a world full of right-handed tools, machines, and instruments.” Clearly if left-
handedness were more prevalent than right-handedness, then left-handed tools would also be more common, and, as
a result, right-handers instead would experience increased risk of accidental death. Thus, it is likely that these fitness
costs are frequency-dependent and symmetric.
In contrast to Billiard et al., Ghirlanda’s model assumes that left- and right-handedness are indeed interchangeable.
Given an initial distribution of 50% left-handers and 50% right-handers, this model predicts that both the observed
distribution and its mirror image are equally likely equilibrium outcomes. On this point, our probabilistic model
agrees with Ghirlanda et al. Given the fact that there is no reason to expect that right-handedness is inherently
superior to left-handedness from a fitness perspective, we assume that the probabilistic transition rates satisfy the
symmetry condition PRL(l) = PLR(1 − l).
S2: Phenotypic model for population dynamics
The probabilistic model described in the main text provides a description of the population dynamics from a top-
down perspective. However, it may be more intuitive to consider the dynamics from a bottom-up perspective. Here
we develop a model using reproductive fitness arguments on the level of individuals and show that this produces
essentially the same result.
Iterative Model
Let us define N to be the total population size, and L and R to be the number of left- and right-handers, respectively.
We make the simplifying assumption that L + R = N , i.e., there are no ambidextrous individuals. Also, define
handedness fractions r = R/N and l = L/N so that r + l = 1.
Suppose that in this population, individuals repeatedly pair off and reproduce, adding new individuals to the
population in each generation. From an evolutionary perspective, the expected number of offspring that individuals
produce should be dependent on their fitness. With all other factors being equal, an individual’s fitness should be
determined by his or her handedness and the distribution of handedness in the population. Thus we define bR(l) and
bL(l) to be expected number of offspring born to right- and left-handers. Also, suppose that a pairing XY produces
left-handed offspring with probability σXY and right-handed offspring with probability 1 − σXY , where X and Y
represent the dominant hands of the parents. We expect σXY = σXY (l) to be a frequency dependent function.
Thus there are 6 possible reproductive interactions (we ignore gender effects here for simplicity—including them
should not qualitatively change the results):
R +R
σRRÐÐ→ L R +L σRLÐÐ→ L L +L σLLÐÐ→ L
R +R
1−σRRÐÐÐÐ→ R R +L 1−σRLÐÐÐÐ→ R L +L 1−σLLÐÐÐ→ R .
At each iteration, we suppose that a fractionD of current members dies off. Then the number of left- and right-handers
7in the new generation is:
Ln+1 = [bRσRRR2n + (bR + bL)σRLRnLn + bLσLLL2n
Nn
] + [1 −D]Ln
Rn+1 = [bR(1 − σRR)R2n + (bR + bL)(1 − σRL)RnLn + bL(1 − σLL)L2n
Nn
] + [1 −D]Rn .
Continuous Model
The iterative perspective is intuitive but has limited predictive capacity. One limitation is that the number of left-
and right-handers are only defined at fixed intervals. To remove this obstacle, we transform the discrete model into
a continuous model. We set βX(l) = bX(l)∆t to be the instantaneous birth rate for individuals with handedness X and
δ = D
∆t
to be the instantaneous death rate. We set X(t) =Xn and X(t+∆t) =Xn+1, and let ∆t→ 0 to obtain ordinary
differential equations for the evolution of R(t), L(t) and N(t). However, these equations are not independent. In
fact, we are interested only in the the evolution of l(t), which is governed by
dl(t)
dt
= [βRσRRr(t)2 + (βR + βL)σRLr(t)l(t) + βLσLLl(t)2] − βeffl(t) . (S2.1)
In order to analyse this ODE assumptions about the functions βX(l) are needed: a first order assumption is that
these should be linear functions of the frequency l, and by symmetry, we expect that βL(l(t)) = βR(1−l(t)). According
to Aggleton et al. [19], the average lifespan of right-handers is 3.31% longer than their left-handed counterparts, with
much of the difference attributable to higher rates of premature death in war and accidents. This indicates that in a
society consisting of roughly 90% right-handers, left-handers appear to have a lower fitness. This fitness differential
should be reflected in the model’s reproductive rates. The overall birth rate βeff in the U.S., a weighted average of
βR and βL, is known: βeff(l∗) = 0.01383 [23]. If we assume that βR (l∗) = 1.0331 ⋅βL (l∗) then linearity and symmetry
allow us to derive expressions for βR and βL:
βL(l) = 1.366 ⋅ 10−2 + 5.811 ⋅ 10−4(l − 1/2)
βR(l) = 1.366 ⋅ 10−2 − 5.811 ⋅ 10−4(l − 1/2) .
From [7], the observed fractions of left-handed offspring σXY are
σRR(l∗) = 0.095 ,
σRL(l∗) = 0.195 ,
σLL(l∗) = 0.261 .
We expect these parameters to be functions of l, but all data is drawn from modern societies where the fraction
left-handed is l = l∗. Fortunately, using symmetry arguments, we can obtain additional points:
σRR(1 − l∗) = 1 − 0.261 ,
σRL(1 − l∗) = 1 − 0.195 ,
σLL(1 − l∗) = 1 − 0.095 .
In a population of uniform handedness, one might expect all offspring to inherit the same handedness as their
parents. However, in practice the situation is more complex. Monozygotic (identical) twins often possess discordant
handedness [7]. Thus, handedness cannot be fully determined by genotype. To account for this, most genetic models
introduce a random component that partially determines handedness. With that motivation, we define ǫXY to be the
probability due to chance that parents with handedness XY produce left-handed offspring in a population consisting
entirely of right-handers. We then obtain:
σRR(0) = ǫRR σRR(1) = 1 − ǫLL
σRL(0) = ǫRL σRL(1) = 1 − ǫRL
σLL(0) = ǫLL σLL(1) = 1 − ǫRR .
It is unclear exactly what values are appropriate for ǫXY since no isolated human population consisting entirely of
left- or right-handers exists. If ǫXY = 0, then equilibria at l = 0, l
∗,1/2,1 − l∗,1 appear and those at l = l∗ and
8l = 1− l∗ are unstable. This is inconsistent with the observed stable fixed point. We therefore assume ǫXY must satisfy
0 < ǫXY < σXY (l∗).
For given ǫXY values, we fit a cubic polynomial to the 4 known points σXY (l) (known at l = 0, l∗,1 − l∗,1) to
obtain smooth approximate functions σXY (l). The resulting dynamical system governed by equation (S2.1) has
either 3 or 5 fixed points: (l∗, 1
2
,1 − l∗) or (l∗, l2, 12 ,1 − l2,1 − l
∗) where l∗ and 1 − l∗ are stable. For example, if we set
ǫRR = ǫRL = ǫLL = 0.02, we see an unstable fixed point at l = 1/2 in addition to the expected stable fixed points at
l = l∗ and l = 1 − l∗.
Up to this point, we have treated l∗ as an unknown parameter. In practice, however, the fraction of the population
that is left-handed can be measured. Estimates for the value of this parameter depend on the precise method
of measurement and definition of left-handedness, but it is generally agreed that this fraction is close to 10% [2].
Equation (S2.1) allows us to compute an independent prediction for l∗ using only the birth rates and the phenotype
ratios of offspring given above (note: the predicted l∗ does not depend on the choice of ǫ although the stability of the
fixed point does). This results in a predicted percent left-handed of 11.78%, consistent with the measured value.
By presenting this model of phenotype evolution, we wish to emphasize the generality of the probabilistic model
presented in the main text. For appropriate choices of functions PRL, equation (2.2) in the main text can be made to
agree nearly identically with model S2.1 above, as demonstrated in figure S1.
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Figure S1. Comparison of probabilistic and phenotypic models. Solid blue line: the function dl/dt [%/yr] generated using
generic sigmoid PRL in the probabilistic model from equation (2.2) of the main text. Dashed red line: the function dl/dt [% /
yr] implied by the phenotypic model from equation (S2.1).
S3: Relating fitness functions to probabilistic transition rates
Often in models of population dynamics, changes in the makeup of a population are related directly to the com-
parative fitness of the individuals within that population. For example, Ghirlanda et al. define a fitness function for
lateralized individuals in terms of two component fitness functions, an antagonistic function and a synergistic function.
They then argue that equilibrium is obtained when the fitness of left- and right-handed individuals are equal [10].
In this paper, however, we employ a different approach. We argue that segments of a population will switch
handedness over long time scales according at a rate determined by a probabilistic function. Thus equilibrium is
obtained when the overall transition rates between left- and right-handed individuals balance. These probabilistic
transition rates should be related to the comparative fitness of the members of the population.
We now determine the relationship between fitness functions fL(l), fR(l) and probabilistic transition rates PRL(l),
PLR(l). Recall that PRL(l) represents the probabilistic transition rate from right to left. Clearly, PRL(l) must be
non-negative. Also, it should reach a maximum (minimum) when the difference in fitness between left- and right-
handers is at a maximum (minimum). The simplest example of such a function is PRL(l) = A(fL(l) − fR(l)) + B,
where A,B > 0 are constants guaranteeing that PRL(l) remains positive. By symmetry, fL(l) = fR(1 − l) and
PRL(l) = PLR(1 − l). Thus PLR(l) = A(fR(l) − fL(l))+B. Transition rates defined in this way satisfy the symmetry
relation PRL(l) +PRL(1 − l) = 2PRL(1/2) and, as such, are sigmoidal for many different types of fitness functions.
9We should note that in this model, the probability PRL(l)∆t that a given individual switches from right to left
within time ∆t is non-zero even when fR(l) > fL(l). In such a situation, the probability that a given left-hander
switches is PLR(l)∆t > PRL(l)∆t. However, if right-handers are much more prevalent than left-handers, the total
number of switches from right to left may still outweigh the number from left to right. In other words, it is possible
that lPLR(l)∆t < rPRL(l)∆t. This would cause the fraction left-handed to increase despite right-handers having a
higher fitness.
Also, if for some l0, fR(l0) = fL(l0), then PRL(l0) = PLR(l0) = B and dldt ∣l0 = (1 − l0)B − l0(B) = (1 − 2l0)B. So if
l0 < 1/2, the fraction left-handed will increase even when the fitness is equal for left- and right-handers. In our model,
having equal fitnesses does not necessarily lead to equilibrium.
Despite the differences between our formulation and a fitness-based formulation, the predictions are similar. If we
use the fitness functions fL(l) = (1−c)e−kal+c(1−e−ksl) similar to those proposed by Ghirlanda et al. we can generate
PRL(l) and PLR(l) (which are sigmoid as expected). In figure S2 we plot the resulting function dl(t)dt for appropriate
parameter values (such as A = 0.0144, B = 0.0047, c = 0.6964, ka = 3.7745, ks = 1.9974) and observe a graph very
similar to figure S1.
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Figure S2. Comparison of probabilistic and fitness-function models. Solid blue line: the function dl/dt [%/yr] generated using
generic sigmoid PRL in the probabilistic model from equation (2.2) of the main text. Dashed red line: the function dl/dt [%/yr]
generated using PRL implied by fitness functions proposed by Ghirlanda et al. [10].
S4: Derivation of athletic selection model
Professional sports are artificial systems that involve varying degrees of competitive and cooperative activities.
Their participants undergo a selection process through tryouts that is in some ways analogous to natural selection.
Additionally, handedness data for professional athletes is widely available. Thus, athletics provide an ideal opportunity
to test whether our model’s predictions are consistent with data from selective systems.
There is a fundamental difference between selection in professional sports and natural selection. In natural selection,
the distribution of a trait within a population changes in response to selection pressure, modifying the gene pool.
Professional athletes, however, represent only a small segment of the much larger human population. Changes in the
distribution of a trait among professional athletes are unlikely to influence the gene pool in the human population;
furthermore, most professional sports have not existed for the time scales required to significantly modify the gene
pool. As a result, the population of professional athletes must draw new members from a pool that consists of about
90% right-handers. Thus, direct comparison of our model to sports data is not possible: instead, we must account for
this more complex selection process in order to make predictions that are applicable to real-world sports.
To begin, we define l∗ to be the fixed point predicted by the probabilistic model (2.2) described in the main text. This
represents the ideal equilibrium distribution of left-handedness in a hypothetical world where all interaction occurs
through the sport under consideration. We assume that skill is normally distributed throughout the population with
mean µ = 0 and standard deviation σ. Because left-handedness is relatively rare, this trait should provide a competitive
advantage in sports involving direct physical confrontation. Let l represent the fraction left-handed within a sport.
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When l deviates from l∗, the sport is not at its ideal equilibrium state, and left-handers must experience a shift in
skill ∆s. We assume that professional sports operate efficiently, that is, they select players exclusively according to
skill level. Then the distributions of skill among left- and right-handers satisfy
pR (s) = 1√
2πσ2
e−
s
2
2σ2
pL (s) = 1√
2πσ2
e−
(s−∆s)2
2σ2
where
∆s = k (l∗ − l) .
In this formulation, when the ideal equilibrium fraction of left-handedness is achieved, their is no advantage to
possessing either handedness and the individuals are selected according their intrinsic skill.
In most sports, individuals must undergo a tryout in order to demonstrate sufficient skill for participation. As a
result only a fraction of the total population is allowed to participate in the sport at a given level of competition.
We define the fraction selected ψ = n/N , where n is the number of individuals selected and N is the size of the total
population. ψ will determine a minimum skill cutoff sc for participation according to the relation
ψ = lbg ∫ ∞
sc
pL (s) ds + (1 − lbg)∫ ∞
sc
pR (s)ds ,
where lbg represents the background rate of left-handedness (≈ 1/10). We can simplify this expression by normalizing
the various parameters by the standard deviation: we set sˆc ≡ sc/√2σ2, ∆sˆ ≡∆s/√2σ2, and kˆ ≡ k/√2σ2 to get
ψ =
1
2
lbgerfc (sˆc −∆sˆ) + 1
2
(1 − lbg)erfc (sˆc) . (S4.1)
In this formulation, the fraction left-handed among the individuals selected will be represented by the first term on
the right-hand side of equation (S4.1) divided by the entire expression,
lsel =
lbg
2ψ
erfc (sˆc −∆sˆ) .
After many tryouts, the fraction left-handed within a sport will stabilize with the lsel = l. This equilibrium fraction
represents the observed fraction left-handed among professional athletes, thus we call it lpro. So, the equilibrium state
is implicitly determined by
lpro =
lbg
2ψ
erfc [sˆc − kˆ (l∗ − lpro)] . (S4.2)
This model has the following properties:
• If l∗ = lbg, then lpro = lbg.
• If the sport is not selective at all, in the limit sˆc → −∞ (ψ → 1), lpro → lbg as this means that selection is
independent of skill.
• As the sport becomes infinitely selective, sˆc → ∞ (ψ → 0), lpro → l∗. In other words, the ideal equilibrium
fraction is achieved when the sport is infinitely selective. (To see this, assume that lsel = l
∗
+ δ and l = l∗ − δ.
Expand in a Taylor series about δ = 0 and take the limit sˆc →∞ to find that δ → 0. Thus lsel → l∗ and l → l∗,
so lpro = l
∗.)
Using this model, we employed numerical techniques to compute the solutions lpro for a variety of sports, and then
compared these results to the observed fractions left-handed as seen in figure 2.
This model can also be extended to examine how the distribution of handedness varies within a single sport. If
left-handedness is a desirable trait (that is, it provides a skill advantage at equilibrium), then we expect that it should
be very prevalent among the most skilled individuals due to the selection mechanism. To see this, we consider the
case of baseball. It is clear that in baseball, l∗ = 1
2
since the sport involves primarily competitive interactions (the
observed lpro ≈ 0.3). Thus, left-handedness is a desirable trait for potential professionals as it will provide a particular
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skill advantage in batting. At the professional level, most hitters face the same set of pitchers and compete indirectly
with one-another for roster spots. They should therefore be expected to experience the same skill advantage due
to handedness. In other words, ∆sˆ = kˆ(l∗ − lpro) is a constant (in sports like boxing, however, where individuals
compete more frequently with others near their own rank, the skill advantage would be a rank-dependent function r,
∆sˆr = kˆ(l∗ − lr)). Ranking the hitters by skill, we observe that the fraction left-handed above rank r should satisfy
lr =
lbgN
2r
erfc (sˆr −∆sˆ) ,
where sˆr satisfies
r =
1
2
lbgNerfc (sˆr −∆sˆ) + 1
2
(1 − lbg)Nerfc (sˆr) .
Using this result, we plotted the predicted fraction left-handed as a function of rank as seen in figure 3. This model
predicts a non-trivial shape for the distribution of handedness within baseball that is consistent with the observed
distribution. This is a strong indication that this athletic selection model provides a good mathematical approximation
for the tryout-based selective mechanism within professional sports.
S5: Data summary
Data used in generation figure 2 came from a variety of sources. The total number of participants came from
surveys conducted by the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association in 2009 [24], except for men’s and women’s
fencing, where participant numbers were extrapolated from data published by the National Federation of State High
School Associations [25]. The number of professional players came from listings of top-rated players (the only ones for
which handedness was readily available) at the internet URLs indicated in Table S1, with the exception of baseball,
football, and hockey, where numbers are absolute totals.
When handedness was not available in tabulated form, it was evaluated based on public photos of players in action.
In Table S1, the predictions for the fraction left-handed were generated using an estimate of the ideal equilibrium
l∗ for each sport. The appropriate value for l∗ depends primarily on the degree of cooperation c for the sport. This
parameter is difficult to estimate in sports that possess clear cooperative and competitive elements. However, in order
to observe fixed points other than l∗ = 1/2, c must exceed a threshold that appears to be relatively high for the types
of transition rates considered in this paper (See figure 1). So, we assumed that l∗ = 1/2 for sports primarily involving
direct confrontations: baseball (batters vs. pitchers), boxing, fencing, table tennis, hockey (defensemen and forwards).
Some sports (or particular positions within sports), however, possess highly lateralized equipment, positioning or
strategy. For these sports, it is ideal for all individuals to possess the same handedness; so, the minority handedness
will be selected against. For example, in football, blocking schemes are often designed to protect a quarterback’s
blind side. As a result, it is beneficial for all quarterbacks on the roster to possess the same handedness in order to
minimize variations of the offensive sets. Consequently, we assume that for quarterbacks in football, golfers, and left
and right wings in hockey the value of c ≈ 1, i.e., l∗ = 0 or 1.
S6: Parameter sensitivity analysis for probabilistic model
In the probabilistic model, there are two unknown functions P coop
RL
(l) and P comp
RL
(l). While general properties of
these functions such as monotonicity are known, the appropriate form for these functions is unknown and is difficult
to determine from data. The generic sigmoid functions
P
comp
RL
(l) = [1 + ek1 1−2ll(1−l) ]−1 (S6.1a)
P
coop
RL
(l) = [1 + e−k2 1−2ll(1−l) ]−1 , (S6.1b)
satisfy restrictions on PRL for k1, k2 >
√
3/2 and capture the essential fixed point behaviour (k1, k2 set the steepness
of the curves). Unfortunately, these equations introduce two new parameters that may alter the dynamics. To
examine the sensitivity of the model to these parameters, we assumed l∗ was the fixed point of the system. We then
computed the partial derivatives of l∗ with respect to each parameter. In the vicinity of l∗ = 1/10, the observed ratio
1
2
Sport Data source Total
partici-
pants
Total
pros
Observed
fraction
left-
handed
Predicted
fraction
left-
handed
Method URL(s)
Baseball Major League Baseball players 1871 to 2009, Lahman Base-
ball Database
2629000 1200 0.329 0.318 Handedness
listed
baseball1.com
Boxing BoxRec, top 200 ranked boxers by class: Heavy-
weight, Cruiserweight, Middleweight, Welterweight, Feath-
erweight, Bantamweight, and Flyweight, September 2010
587000 1056 0.201 0.304 Handedness
listed
boxrec.com
Fencing, Men Federation Internationale D’Escrime, top 25 ranked for
each weapon: Epee, Saber and Foil, 2010
1462 75 0.200 0.247 Handedness
listed
fie.ch
Fencing,
Women
Federation Internationale D’Escrime, top 25 ranked for
each weapon: Epee, Saber and Foil, 2011
1123 75 0.253 0.240 Handedness
listed
fie.ch
Football,
Quarterbacks
National Football League, active players, preseason 2010 75071 120 0.067 0.064 Google
image
search
nfl.com
Golf, Men PGA TOUR, top earners 2009 4600000 120 0.042 0.059 PGA Tour
profile
images
pgatour.com
Golf, Women Ladies Professional Golf Association, top earners 2010 1000000 100 0.000 0.060 LPGA Tour
profile
images
lpga.com
Hockey, De-
fensemen and
Forwards
National Hockey League, active players, preseason 2010 309971 601 0.323 0.303 Shot side
listed
espn.go.com/nhl
Hockey, Left
Wings
National Hockey League, active players, preseason 2010 80458 156 0.090 0.065 Shot side
listed
espn.go.com/nhl
Hockey, Right
Wings
National Hockey League, active players, preseason 2010 91805 178 0.742 0.613 Shot side
listed
espn.go.com/nhl
Table Tennis,
Men
International Table Tennis Federation, top ranked players,
November 2010
1586628 100 0.280 0.333 Ranking
photo
ittf.com
Table Tennis,
Women
International Table Tennis Federation, top ranked players,
November 2010
654372 100 0.200 0.327 Ranking
photo
ittf.com
Table S1. Summary of data sources used in preparing figure 2.
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of left-handers in human populations, and in the range of k1 ∈ [√32 ,∞), k2 ∈ [
√
3
2
,∞) and c ∈ (0,1), we found that
∣∂l∗
∂c
∣
∣ ∂l∗
∂k1
∣ ≥ O(10
2) and ∣
∂l
∗
∂c
∣
∣ ∂l∗
∂k2
∣ ≥ O(10
2) .
Thus for a wide range of parameter values, ∣∂l∗
∂c
∣ ≫ ∣ ∂l∗
∂k2
∣ and ∣∂l∗
∂c
∣ ≫ ∣ ∂l∗
∂k1
∣ near the fixed point l∗ = 1
10
. In other
words, the location of the fixed point is more sensitive to c than k1 and k2 by several orders of magnitude for physically
allowable k-values. Therefore we are justified in ignoring the effects of individual choices of k1 and k2 in order to
focus on the effects of the choice of c. We believe these results are robust for various different sigmoid functions
P
comp
RL
, P
coop
RL
.
